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Foreign Transfers and Tropical
Deforestation: What Terms of
Conditionality?
Daan van Soest and Robert Lensink
The international community considers the possibility of using aid as an instrument to improve nat-
ural resource conservation in developing countries. By making the amount of transfers dependent
on the efforts of the recipient countries to improve conservation, appropriate incentives can be
given. We propose a transfer function in which developing countries are linearly rewarded for hav-
ing a positive stock of forest, and where the amount of donations is negatively related to the rate
of deforestation. This transfer function enables the international community to improve long-term
forest conservation as well as the rate of deforestation during the adjustment period.
Key words: conditionality, deforestation, foreign transfers, land allocation model.
International concern about the global con-
sequences of environmental degradation in
developing countries has increased consid-
erably over the last twenty years. Given
the fact that the global marginal beneﬁts of
environmental protection very often exceed
its domestic marginal beneﬁts because envi-
ronmental degradation has transboundary
effects, a level of environmental protection
develops that is suboptimally low from the
point of view of the international community.
This implies that, if industrialized countries
indeed want improved protection of the envi-
ronment in developing countries, they should
be willing to compensate them ﬁnancially.
Therefore, the international community con-
templates conditioning foreign aid donation
or debt reduction on the efforts of developing
countries’ governments to combat environ-
mental degradation (Jepma; Kolk 1996, 1998;
Van Kooten, Sedjo, and Bulte).
One of the principal resources to which
these considerations apply is tropical rain-
forests. Deforestation occurs mainly because
forested land is converted to agricultural use.
Although most rainforests can be described
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as open-access resources, governments of
tropical forested countries affect the rate
of deforestation considerably. Partly, those
governments stimulate deforestation directly
as they develop land use plans in which
part of the forests is designated to be con-
verted to agricultural use. They also affect
deforestation indirectly by developing agri-
cultural colonization programs in rainforests
and by increasing the proﬁtability of agricul-
ture, through changes in the prices of natu-
ral resources and agricultural output. In this
decision-making process, the ﬂow of services
provided by the rainforests (such as stor-
age of greenhouse gases and conservation of
biodiversity) that have beneﬁcial transbound-
ary consequences is largely ignored precisely
because no compensation takes place. The
existence of these externalities gives a justiﬁ-
cation for ﬁnancial transfers to induce devel-
oping countries to conserve the forests.
In practice, several initiatives have been
taken to improve forest conservation in
developing countries. One is the debt-for-
nature swap, carried out by both private orga-
nizations and governments of industrialized
countries. Typically, a portion of a devel-
oping country’s external debt is converted
(at a discount) to domestic currency obliga-
tions, which are often placed in an environ-
mental trust fund. These funds are used by
local environmental organizations to attain
their objectives, such as management of pro-
tected areas. One of the main disadvantages
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is that a developing country’s government
may decide to renege on actions promised in
the debt-for-nature agreement, or even seize
the conservation fund. Given sovereignty, it
is difﬁcult to enforce the debt-for-nature
agreement as sanctions are lacking. The con-
sequences are that projects are generally
avoided that may be contrary to the govern-
ment’s self-interest, and that debt-for-nature
swaps are implemented only in politically sta-
ble countries (Deacon and Murphy).
Given the once-and-for-all nature of debt-
for-nature swaps, it may be useful to estab-
lish a more long-term relationship with local
governments, where local governments are
continuously rewarded for their conservation
efforts.An initiative of this type is the Global
Environment Facility (GEF), which was cre-
ated in 1991 through a joint effort of the
World Bank, the Environmental Programme
of the United Nations (UNEP), and the
United Nations Developmental Programme
(UNDP). GEF provides concessional funding
to developing countries for projects that deal
with threats to biological diversity, climate
change, pollution of international waters, and
depletion of the ozone layer (World Bank,
p. 133). Projects to counter deforestation are
also eligible for funding, if they are related
to one of these four main areas. This scheme
is an improvement relative to debt-for-nature
swaps because funds are provided period-
ically rather than once-and-for-all, so that
lack of compliance by local governments can
be discouraged by threatening to cut the
aid ﬂow.
Conditional transfers have also received a
substantial amount of attention in the eco-
nomic literature. Some papers focus on the
effects of lump-sum donations of aid. This
type of aid donation can be an effective
instrument to combat deforestation, since
it reduces the necessity to exploit forests
in order to earn foreign exchange (Barbier
and Rauscher, Pearce and Warford, p. 17).
However, this is a rather passive way to use
the instrument of foreign transfers. Attention
is now shifting to how aid can be used more
actively by making the amount of trans-
fers conditional on the efforts of tropical
forested countries to improve forest con-
servation (Kolk 1996, 1998). An important
theoretical contribution to this literature is
Sta¨hler, who proves that long-run forest con-
servation can be improved unambiguously
if a ﬁxed transfer is given per unit of for-
est conserved. However, the impact of such
a scheme on short-run conservation perfor-
mance should also be analyzed. Since tropical
deforestation is to a large extent irreversible,
the slower deforestation takes place, the
better (Dudley, Jeanrenaud, and Sullivan, p. 3,
Kolk 1996).
This paper analyzes how the international
community may improve both short- and
long-run forest conservation by conditioning
foreign aid transfers. We propose a transfer
function in which developing countries are
linearly rewarded for having a positive stock
of forest, but the amount of the donation is
negatively related to the rate of deforesta-
tion. With respect to the dependency on the
rate of deforestation we propose both lin-
ear and quadratic dependency. We will show
that linearly rewarding on the basis of the
forest stock and linearly punishing on defor-
estation have similar consequences in terms
of short- and long-term forest conservation.
However, the ﬁnancial consequences differ
substantially. We will also show that by using
this transfer function, the donor countries
can both improve long-term forest conser-
vation as well as the rate of deforestation
during the adjustment period. In practice,
most aid contracts only deal with one side of
the coin: countries are rewarded for a pol-
icy that improves forest conservation, but are
not “punished” for short-run deforestation.
We show that, from the point of view of the
donor countries, these policies are welfare
improving in the long run, but suboptimal in
the short run.
The main contributions of the paper are
the following. First, we solve for both the
long-run equilibrium and the adjustment
path, whereas Sta¨hler does not consider the
adjustment path. Second, we use a fairly
sophisticated land allocation model for the
aid recipient. This allows us to examine in
much greater detail the channels by which
the aid conditionality affects long- and short-
run forest conservation. Third, we explicitly
solve for optimal values in the aid allocation
function by assuming different weights in the
utility function of the donor community.
We start by formulating the objectives of
the donor community and by identifying
the constraints it faces. Next the actions of
the aid recipient are considered.We show the
consequences of the proposed compensation
function in terms of both short- and long-
run forest conservation. Then we numerically
derive the values of the parameters in the aid
donation function that maximizes the donor
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community’s utility. Finally, conclusions are
drawn and the policy implications of our the-
oretical analysis are derived.
The Model for the Donor Community’s
Optimization Problem
The aim of the paper is to derive an aid
donation function that best serves the donor
community’s interest in terms of rainforest
conservation. The problem is solved recur-
sively in the sense that ﬁrst the recipient
country’s optimal response to a speciﬁcation
of the aid donation function is derived, after
which the donor community sets the dona-
tion function’s parameters at their optimal
level. The donor community offers an aid
contract in which the terms of conditionality
are spelled out.The recipient chooses the rate
of deforestation to maximize its own utility,
given the terms of the contract. We assume
that there is complete information and that
the donor costlessly monitors the actions of
the recipient. Therefore, the donor commu-
nity knows the optimal level of action of
the aid recipient for each possible contract.
Hence the donor is able to devise the con-
tract in such a way that the action of the aid
recipient is optimal for the donor. However,
since the aid recipient can refuse the contract,
the donor community should take a partici-
pation constraint into account in devising the
optimal contract. This implies that the devel-
oping country’s welfare when it accepts the
contract is at least equal to its welfare if the
contract is not accepted.
The maximization problem of the donor
community is as follows:
V = max
∫ ∞
0
e−rtU(F(t)	 S(t)) dt(1)
st S(t) = S(F(t)	D(t))(2)
F˙ (t) = −D(t)(3)
WS ≥ WNS(4)
The donor community maximizes the dis-
counted value of its instantaneous utility U ,
which depends positively on the size of the
forest stock (F , measured in units of land)
and negatively on the foreign aid transfer
(S). Equation (2) describes the aid contract
of the donor community. In Sta¨hler’s model,
the compensation function depends only on
the forest stock in each period. We include
the possibility of punishment based on defor-
estation (D, also measured in units of land)
since, as will be shown in the next section,
this will give the donor community a better
opportunity to improve both short- and long-
run forest conservation. Equation (3) states
that the change in forest size (F˙ ) equals the
rate of deforestation. Finally, equation (4)
is the participation constraint. This equation
guarantees that the discounted value of the
net revenues for the aid recipient if it par-
ticipates (WS) is at least as high as the dis-
counted value of the revenues when it rejects
the aid contract (WNS).
1
The next section describes the decision-
making process of the recipient country that
maximizes its own welfare by choosing an
optimal rate of deforestation in each period
(given the speciﬁcation of the aid contract).
The Model for the Aid Recipient
A study of using foreign aid to improve
forest conservation requires a model that
allows for a realistic explanation of how
deforestation takes place. This implies that
the model should compare the revenues that
can be obtained from forest conservation,
or selective logging, with the revenues from
deforestation. With regard to the revenues
from deforestation, the income obtained
from selling timber is obvious. However, it
is extremely important that the revenues
from alternative land use are also consid-
ered (see Chomitz and Kumari). It is well
known that one of the main direct causes
of deforestation in rainforest areas is con-
version to agricultural land.2 With respect
to the ﬁnancial revenues from forest con-
servation, an important issue is the positive
effect of the proximity of forests on agri-
cultural productivity. Furthermore, there are
market forces, such as changes in prices of
timber, which may lead to an automatic stop
to deforestation overtime (Hyde, Amacher,
1 In the remainder of the text, subscript S denotes the value
of the variable when the aid donation function is in place while
subscript NS denotes its value in the absence of an aid contract.
2 Although agricultural activities are not necessarily incompati-
ble with forest conservation, in practice incentive structures (e.g.,
arising from government policy or inadequate tenure systems)
are such that agricultural conversion results in actual deforesta-
tion (Repetto and Gillis). Forestry activities can also inﬂict sub-
stantial damage upon the forests, but they rarely result in actual
deforestation (Cannon, Peart, and Leighton). The forestry tech-
nique most often applied is selective logging, in which only a few
trees of high commercial value are logged and extracted.
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and Margrath, Vincent and Gillis). Hence,
especially when both the adjustment path of
deforestation and the long-run equilibrium
are study objects, as is the case in this paper,
it is important that the model allows for rel-
ative price changes.
Probably the best model available that
deals with the above mentioned issues is the
one by Ehui, Hertel, and Preckel. With a few
minor adaptations, this model is able to cap-
ture the full consequences of the impact of
conditional aid donation on the allocation of
land to forestry and agriculture. It allows for
an analysis of not only the long-run equilib-
rium but also of the depletion path toward
it. In the model the government of a country
endowed with rainforests aims to maximize
the net present value of forest exploitation,
choosing the optimal rate of deforestation in
each period. We have modiﬁed their model
by simplifying it somewhat, by taking into
account that conversion timber can be sold,
by specifying all equations explicitly, and by
adding a conditional transfer function.3 Our
model is as follows:
W = maxD
∫ ∞
0
R(t)e−rt dt(5)
st F˙ (t) = −D(t)(6)
R(t) = P(t)q(t)+ PA(t)Z(t)(7)
×[F0 − F(t)]+ S(t)
q(t) = nD(t)+ γn(F(t)−D(t))(8)
P(t) = P¯ − θq(t)(9)
Z(t) = Z¯ + αD(t)− β[F0 − F(t)](10)
S(t) = S(F(t)	D(t))(11)
In this model, the net present value of instan-
taneous net revenues4 (R(t), discounted at
rate r) is maximized by choosing the opti-
mal rate of deforestation (D) in each period
(equation (5)).Depletion of the forest stock is
3 The reader will note that the Ehui, Hertel, and Preckel (EHP)
model is already quite complicated. Simpler models are avail-
able such as Sta¨hler, which uses a concave utility function with
deforestation as the only argument. However, the EHP model
provides a much richer explanation of how deforestation takes
place over time. This is important when one wants to examine
how aid should be conditioned in order to improve both long-
and short-run forest conservation.
4 We assume all production to be costless: including costs
would only complicate the mathematics without changing the
results. Hence, the terms revenues and net revenues can be
used interchangeably.
represented by the equation of motion (equa-
tion (6)). The size of the forest stock (F ) falls
over time at the rate of deforestation.
Equation (7) shows that revenues are
derived from forestry activities, agricultural
production, and foreign transfers. Forestry
revenues in each period are equal to the
quantity of timber supplied (q) in that period
multiplied by the prevailing price (P ) in
that period. The quantity produced q is pre-
sented in equation (8). Suppose that there
are n commercially valuable stems per unit of
land. Timber is produced using either clear-
felling or selective logging. Clearfelling takes
place on land that is to be converted to
agricultural land. Under clearfelling all com-
mercially valuable timber is removed; the
quantity of timber produced through clear-
felling thus equals n times D. Timber is also
produced using selective logging techniques
(which do inﬂict some damage upon the
forests but do not cause a permanent reduc-
tion in biomass). Under selective logging,
only a fraction of the timber is extracted,
which is reﬂected by parameter γ, with γ < 1.
The amount of timber produced through
selective logging thus equals the amount of
commercially valuable timber extracted per
unit of land (γ times n) multiplied with the
area that is not converted to agricultural use
(F − D).5 For convenience, we set n equal
to one, so that the timber price P reﬂects
the value of all commercially valuable tim-
ber present per unit of land. For mathemati-
cal simplicity, the timber demand function is
assumed to be linear (see equation (9)).6
The second term in equation (7) represents
agricultural revenues. These equal the mone-
tary yield per unit of land times the amount
of land under cultivation (F0 − F(t), where
F0 is the initial size of the rainforest area).
All deforested land is converted to agricul-
tural land, which is assumed to become pro-
ductive instantaneously. The monetary yield
consists of the price of agricultural products
(PA, which is assumed to be ﬁxed at P¯A),
7
5 Alternatively, equation (8) can be rewritten as q = γnF +
(1 − γ)nD. The entire forest area is logged selectively (yielding
an amount of timber equal to γnF ). In the area to be converted,
clearfelling implies that the remaining fraction of timber ((1 −
γ)n) is also harvested, yielding an amount of timber equal to
(1− γ)nD.
6 The use of a downward-sloping timber demand function is
based on a survey of the literature presented by Barbier et al.
(p. 43). They show that indeed the tropical timber demand func-
tion is downward sloping at a country level. It can easily be
shown that our main results are not affected by this assumption.
7 The assumption of a ﬁxed price for agricultural produce facil-
itates the mathematics without changing the results.
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multiplied by the average per-unit land pro-
ductivity Z. As is reﬂected in equation (10),
land productivity is not ﬁxed. On the one
hand, current deforestation (D) contributes
to average soil productivity. Burning of the
forest cover increases average soil produc-
tivity because of the release of nutrients
(Hecht). A newly deforested area is very fer-
tile in the short run, but it can be culti-
vated for only a limited period of time. Soil
productivity falls quickly during cultivation
because of nutrient depletion (Lo´pez and
Niklitschek, OTA). Therefore, only current
deforestation contributes to average soil pro-
ductivity. On the other hand, the proximity
of forest cover increases average soil produc-
tivity because it prevents erosion and accel-
erates soil formation by shedding organic
material onto the fallow land (Ehui, Hertel,
and Preckel). Hence, cumulative deforesta-
tion (F0−F ) has a negative effect on average
soil productivity.8
The third source of revenue is a foreign
transfer (equation (11)). The general form of
this equation has already been described in
the previous section (see equation (2)).
The solution of this model yields a net
present value which is denoted WS . If no
aid is given, equation (11) can be ignored, S
equals zero in equation (7), and the resulting
net present value is denoted as WNS .
The equilibrium size of the forest area
is found by solving the current value
Hamiltonian of the model:
H(D	F	 λ)(12)
= [Pq + P¯AZ[F0 − F ]
+ S(D	F )]− λD
Applying Pontryagin’s maximum principle
and assuming an interior solution results in
the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
λ(t) = (1−γ)P (t)+αP¯A[F0−F(t)](13)
−θ(1−γ)q(t)+SD
λ˙(t) = rλ(t)−γP (t)−βP¯A[F0−F(t)](14)
−SF +P¯AZ(t)+γθq(t)
The interpretation of equation (13) is that
in each period the costs of deforesting an
8 Of course, it is a crude simpliﬁcation to use average agricul-
tural productivity, especially when marginal deforestation deci-
sions will subsequently be analyzed. However, this approach
is mathematically simple and the ﬁnal conclusions will not be
altered qualitatively if soil productivity is modelled in a more
sophisticated way.
extra unit of forested land now rather than
in the future (i.e., the current-value shadow
price λ) are equal to the (net) beneﬁts of
currently deforesting that extra unit. These
beneﬁts consist of four parts.The ﬁrst term on
the right-hand side (RHS) reﬂects the direct
revenues of deforestation resulting from the
extra timber sold.The second term represents
the increased agricultural revenues arising
from the positive effect of current deforesta-
tion on agricultural productivity. The third
term is the effect of a fall in the price at which
the entire timber supply is sold as a result
of the extra timber extracted from the defor-
ested unit of land. The last term on the RHS
is the loss in revenue caused by the condition-
ality of transfers on the rate of deforestation
(SD < 0).
Equation (14) is a straightforward exten-
sion of the Hotelling rule (Hotelling). It is an
intertemporal nonarbitrage condition, which
dictates that for an optimal solution no gain
in proﬁts can be achieved by reallocating
deforestation from one period to another.
This implies that the current-value shadow
price of the forest stock should increase at
rate r , reduced with the net beneﬁts of keep-
ing an additional unit of land forested. These
net beneﬁts are equal to the marginal return
on forest conservation minus the opportunity
costs of holding on to the marginal unit of
forested land. The marginal return on for-
est conservation equals the sum of the rev-
enue that can be earned by logging this unit
of forest land selectively (γP ), the value of
the contribution of forest conservation to soil
productivity (βP¯A(F0−F )), and the return in
the form of transfers resulting from condi-
tionality on changes in forest size (SF ). The
opportunity costs of conserving an additional
unit of forest land are the revenues earned by
having an extra unit of land under cultivation
(P¯AZ) and the timber price increase (γθq)
that would result from deforestation because
of reduced (future) supply.
The Derivation of the Long-Run Size of the
Forests and the Depletion Path
If the tropical forested country decides to
participate in the contract, the equilibrium
size of the rainforest area can be found
by setting the time derivatives (F˙ and λ˙
in equations (6) and (14)) equal to zero.
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The resulting equilibrium forest size (F ∗) is9
F ∗ = F0− [
(
P¯AZ¯− [γ − r(1− γ)](15)
× [P(F0)− θγF0]+ rSD −SF
)/
(
PA[2β− rα]
+ 2γθ[γ − r(1− γ)])]
Although this equation is complex, the inter-
pretation is straightforward. The numerator
of the second term on the RHS reﬂects
the net present value of converting the ﬁrst
unit of forest land. The present value of
the economic beneﬁts of deforesting the
ﬁrst unit of land is weighed against the
present value of the economic beneﬁts of
selective logging. The numerator can either
be postive or negative, as can be seen
below:
(1− γ)[P(0)− θγF0]+
P¯AZ¯
r
(16)
≥? γ
r
[P(0)− θγF0]− SD +
SF
r

The LHS of (16) is the present value of
the marginal revenues of deforestation, which
consists of the one-shot revenues of exces-
sive logging (taking into account the effect
on the price due to the downward-sloping
demand function) and the present value of
the future revenues arising from the conver-
sion into agricultural land. The RHS is the
present value of the marginal costs of defor-
estation. The ﬁrst term reﬂects the beneﬁts
of selective logging that would be lost (con-
sisting of the sales price and the effect of
not deforesting a unit of land on the sales
price). The second and third terms occur
because the donation function is assumed to
be conditional. If the scheme depends on cur-
rent deforestation only, there are one-shot
losses in terms of the reduction in foreign
transfers. If the scheme depends on cumula-
tive deforestation, deforesting a unit of land
has ﬁnancial consequences not only now but
also in the future. If the present value of
the marginal revenue stream of deforestation
(LHS) exceeds the present value of marginal
revenues generated by forest conserva-
tion (RHS), at least some deforestation is
desirable.
The denominator in equation (15) acts as a
multiplier, which has to be positive in order
9 The steady state solution of this model satisﬁes the transver-
sality condition that either the forest stock or its present-
value shadow price should go to zero as time goes to
inﬁnity.
to ensure the existence of an optimum. This
means that if the increase in agricultural yield
from current deforestation (α) is very large
compared to the present value of the contri-
bution of the forest stock to agricultural yield
(β) given the discount rate (r), the model col-
lapses. In their empirical application of this
model, Ehui and Hertel ﬁnd that in the case
of Ivory Coast the denominator is positive.
In our model used in this section, the fact
that the demand function for timber is down-
ward sloping (θ is positive) implies that it
is even more likely that the denominator is
positive.10
In order to derive the depletion path,
the transfer function needs to be explic-
itly speciﬁed. The results of Sta¨hler imply
that linear dependency on the size of the
forest stock (F ) is expected to improve
forest conservation. With respect to depen-
dency on the rate of deforestation (D),
it may prove to be useful to assume
both linear and quadratic dependency.
Therefore, we construct the following
speciﬁcation:
S(t) = aF(t)− cD(t)− d
2
(D(t))2(17)
Since the rate of deforestation equals zero
in long-run equilibrium, this speciﬁcation
implies that SF equals a and SD equals −c
in equation (15). The depletion path toward
the long-run equilibrium can be calculated
by taking the time derivative of the costate
variable λ in (13), inserting the result
together with the equation of motion (6)
and the speciﬁed transfer function (17) into
equation (14), and solving the resulting
second-order differential equation (Apostol,
pp. 322–28):
F(t) = (F0 − F ∗)(18)
· EXP
{
− [( 14 r 2 + [P¯A(2β− rα)
+ 2γθ(γ − r(1− γ))]
· [d + 2θ(1− γ)2]−1)1/2
− 12 r ]t
}
+ F ∗
It is noteworthy that, unlike d, the parame-
ters a and c do not enter the exponent of
10 The assumption that initially the entire forest area is logged
selectively rather than by clearfelling implies that the discounted
proﬁts of selective logging (γP (0)/r) exceed the one-shot proﬁts
of clearing the residual stand ((1 − γ)P (0)). Consequently, the
term (γ − r(1− γ)) is positive.
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equation (18). Parameters a and c only indi-
rectly affect F(t) by increasing the equilib-
rium forest size F ∗. In the next sub-section
the implications of this for effects of changes
in the parameters of the compensation func-
tion on both the long-run equilibrium forest
size as well as on the forest size during the
adjustment period are considered.
The Environmental Consequences of the
Choice of the Compensation Function
We start the analysis by considering the
effects of conditioning transfers on the
remaining stock of the forest area. In general,
rewarding forest conservation gives an incen-
tive to achieve a higher size of the forest area
in the long run and in the short run, as can
be seen by calculating the ﬁrst derivatives of
F ∗ and F(t) with respect to a:
∂F ∗
∂a
= 1
(2β−rα)P¯A+2θγ(γ−r(1−γ))
(19)
>0
∂F(t)
∂a
(20)
={1−EXP{−[( 14 r 2+[P¯A(2β−rα)
+2γθ(γ−r(1−γ))]
·[d+2θ(1−γ)2]−1)1/2− 12 r ]t
}}
× ∂F
∗
∂a
>0
Equation (19) shows that, if a tropical
forested country receives a certain amount of
money for each unit of forest land left, forest
conservation is improved in the long run; i.e.,
the equilibrium forest size is increased. The
donation of a ﬁxed amount of money per unit
of forest land also affects the instantaneous
rate of deforestation. Equation (20) shows
that increasing a results in an increase in for-
est cover in each period. Hence, if the com-
pensation function is linear in F (i.e., S=aF ),
per-unit compensation is ﬁxed and forest con-
servation is improved both in the long and
in the short run. The short-run effect arises
exclusively from the fact that increasing a
decreases the optimal amount of cumulative
deforestation (F0−F ∗), which implies that
the area deforested in each period should
also be lower.
When the rate of deforestation is included
in the compensation function, the compara-
tive static results are as follows:
∂F ∗
∂c
=r ∂F
∗
∂a
(21)
∂F(t)
∂c
=r ∂F(t)
∂a
>0(22)
Hence, increasing c also improves the long-
run equilibrium size. However, as is clear
from (21), rewarding forest conservation will
have a larger positive impact on the long-run
equilibrium forest size than conditioning on
the rate of deforestation: increasing param-
eter c by one unit results in an increase in
long-run forest size that is only a fraction r
of the improvement achieved by increasing
parameter a by one unit. The reason is that
deforesting a unit at a certain moment only
has a one-period impact in case of condition-
ing on the ﬂow indicator whereas the neg-
ative effect lasts forever if conditioning is
based on the stock variable. Equation (22)
shows that increasing c also reduces the
short-run rates of deforestation. However,
again this exclusively results from a reduction
in total cumulative deforestation.
The comparative statics results with respect
to parameter d are as follows:
∂F ∗
∂d
=0(23)
∂F(t)
∂d
= 1
2
t(F(t)−F ∗)(24)
·
{
1
4 r
2+[P¯A(2β−rα)
+2γθ(γ−r(1−γ))]
·[d+2θ(1−γ)2]−1
}1/2
× P¯A(2β−rα)+2θ(γ−r(1−γ))
[d+2θ(1−γ)]2
>0
From equation (23) it is clear that d does not
affect F ∗: letting transfers depend negatively
on the rate of deforestation in a nonlin-
ear way does not have an effect on long-
run forest conservation. The reason is that by
deﬁnition deforestation is zero in the steady
state. However, “punishing” quadratically on
current deforestation does affect the path
directly by changing the value of the expo-
nential term in (18). This occurs because (24)
implies that the forest size is increased in
every period as d is increased. The marginal
reduction of transfers increases with the rate
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of deforestation so that the recipient country
has an incentive to ﬂatten the depletion path
over time.
On the basis of the comparative statics
analysis, two main conclusions can be drawn.
First, long-run forest conservation can be
improved by linearly punishing on defor-
estation or by rewarding forest conservation
using a ﬁxed per-unit compensation price.
Second, in order to improve short-run for-
est conservation in a direct way, the donor
community should punish deforestation at an
increasing rate. Thus, the policy of reward-
ing on the basis of the forest stock and
linearly punishing on deforestation are effec-
tive in improving long-run forest conserva-
tion, whereas a policy of “punishing” quadrat-
ically on the rate of deforestation has a strong
beneﬁcial impact on forest conservation dur-
ing the adjustment period.
The Welfare Consequences of the Choice
of the Compensation Function
In the previous section we have shown that
the environmental impact of a change in a
is directly proportional to the impact of a
change in c while the impact of parameter d
on the depletion path and long-run for-
est stock is radically different. However,
the ﬁnancial consequences of a and c dif-
fer substantially, thus affecting the donor
community’s utility and the recipient coun-
tries’ welfare. Up until know, the analysis
has ignored the welfare impact of the spec-
iﬁcation of the aid contract. The impact on
the recipient countries’ welfare is especially
important. The donor community’s choice of
a, c, and d is constrained by the fact that the
contract should be such that participation is
not detrimental to tropical forested countries.
Therefore, the ﬁnal step in the analysis is
the determination of a combination of the
parameters a, c, and d that maximizes the
present value of the donor’s utility, given the
actions of the recipients, as well as the partici-
pation constraint.Assume, for reasons of con-
venience, a linear speciﬁcation for the donor’s
utility function (1):
V =maxa	c	d
∫ ∞
0
[νF(t)−wS(t)]e−rt dt(25)
where ν and w are the weights of forest con-
servation and expenditures on aid, respec-
tively. The model is solved as follows. The
tropical forest country’s optimal depletion
path is calculated ﬁrst, taking parameters
a, c, and d as given. Then we insert the
resulting paths of F and D in the donor
community’s decision problem, and maximize
the discounted value of its utility ﬂow with
respect to parameters a, c, and d for rather
arbitrary values of ν and w.11 For reasons of
space, we do not present the detailed deriva-
tions here.
Given the complexity of the model, ana-
lytical solutions cannot be derived. However,
presenting some of the numerical solutions
provides insight into the underlying mecha-
nisms of the model. Table 1 presents results
for three combinations of ν and w.
Given that the size of the equilibrium rain-
forest area in the case where the aid recipient
does not participate in the aid contract (F ∗NS)
is 1,294, the table shows that the donor com-
munity is indeed able to improve long-run
forest conservation. For all contracts applied
in this table the long-run equilibrium size of
the rainforest area is above the equilibrium
size of the rainforest area when the recipi-
ent does not participate. Therefore, the donor
community is able to devise an aid contract
that satisﬁes the participation constraint and
at the same time reduces the depletion of
the rainforest area. The donor community is
also better off under an aid scheme: the dis-
counted value of the donor community’s util-
ity under an aid scheme (VS) always exceeds
the value in the absence of such a scheme
(VNS).
The table also shows, as expected, that
transfers increase when donors care more
about preserving the rainforest area (com-
pare the ﬁrst and second scenario in table 1).
Furthermore, if the disutility of provided
funds falls (compare the ﬁrst and third sce-
nario in table 1), both the long-run equilib-
rium rainforest area (F ∗S ) and the amount
of funds provided (S∗) increase. The changes
in the values of the control variables are as
follows. An increase in the marginal utility
of forest conservation (ν) or a decrease in
the marginal disutility of spending money (w)
results unambiguously in a higher compen-
sation per unit of forest conserved (a). For
the other two control variables, no straight-
forward conclusions can be drawn. In gen-
eral there is a trade-off between the two: an
11 The derivation comes down to solving the integral (equa-
tion (25)), setting up a Lagrangian by taking into account the par-
ticipation constraint, and ﬁnally taking the ﬁrst derivatives with
respect to a, c, d, and the Lagrangian multiplier. The derivations
can be obtained from the authors on request.
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Table 1. The Optimal Values of a, c, and d for Different Values of  and w, and the Result-
ing Long-Run Forest Size (F∗s ), Discounted Value of Aid Donated (S
∗), and Net Improve-
ment in the Discounted Value of the Donor Community’s Utility (VS−VNS)
(v	w) (1, 0.0001) (5, 0.0001) (1, 0.00001)
a 87457 98253 93542
c 2,51929 8,70423 2,47299
d 6190 3144 7040
F ∗S 1,35257 1,39004 1,35548
S∗ 3	907	027 5	068	652 4	508	311
VS−VNS 1,03448 6,54637 1,49377
Parameter values: P¯ =40	000	 θ=20	 P¯A=100	 γ=015	 r=01	 Z¯=250	 α=01	 β=01	 F0=2	500.
increase in either c or d implies that the
other control variable should be decreased in
order to satisfy the participation constraint.
For the parameter values chosen, an increase
in ν results in an increase in c and a decrease
in d. Apparently, a strong increase in the
long-run equilibrium size of the forest (with
subsequent positive effect on the depletion
path, albeit limited) is preferred to a sub-
stantial improvement in short-run forest con-
servation. A decrease in w has the opposite
effect: c is lowered and d is increased.
It must be remarked that the results are
fairly sensitive to the relative size of the
parameters ν and w. The reason for this is
the speciﬁcation of the donor community’s
utility function: given the difference in mag-
nitude of the two arguments, the values of
the respective parameters have to be adjusted
accordingly.
The impact of designing a compensation
scheme using optimal values for a, c, and
d can also be shown graphically. Figure 1
presents two cases for different preferences
of the donor community and the path that
results when no aid is provided. The line
resulting in the largest long-run forest size
represents the depletion path in the case
where ν=5 and w=00001. The line result-
ing in a somewhat lower long-run forest size
corresponds to the case where ν=1 and
w=000001. The lowest line represents the
depletion of the rainforest area when no
aid is provided (non-participation).The graph
clearly shows that aid contracts not only
increase the equilibrium forest area but also
lengthen the path to the equilibrium. Hence,
rainforest conservation is improved in both
the short and long run.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper presents an analysis of the conse-
quences of making aid dependent on forest
conservation in order to reduce the attrac-
tiveness of deforestation from the point of
view of tropical forested countries. It is shown
that rewarding forest conservation by pay-
ing a ﬁxed amount of money per unit of for-
est conserved increases forest conservation
unambiguously in the long run. Improving
the long-run size implies that cumulative
deforestation falls, and hence that the area
deforested will be smaller in each period.This
means that this instrument is fairly effective
in improving long-run forest conservation,
but only slightly so in improving short-run
conservation.
A more active short-run policy may
be envisaged where transfers also depend
negatively on current deforestation.We show
that linear dependency has similar conse-
quences in terms of short- and long-run forest
conservation than has rewarding forest con-
servation using a ﬁxed per-unit compensation
price. However, we also show that the donor
community’s utility and the recipient coun-
tries’ welfare are affected differently due to
different ﬁnancial effects. Moreover, we show
that short-run forest conservation is best
achieved when the donor community decides
to decrease aid donations at an increasing
rate when the rate of deforestation rises.
Conditioning ﬁnancial aid on the devel-
oping countries’ efforts to protect the envi-
ronment has been implemented for more
than a decade, under programs such as the
debt-for-nature swaps and GEF. However,
both these initiatives suffer from the same
drawback: positive policies are rewarded, but
negative policies are not punished. We pro-
pose to make the forest conservation plan
part of an overall World Bank or IMF funded
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Figure 1. The depletion path resulting from the donor community’s optimal combination of
reward and punishment for (, w) is (1, 0.00001) and (5, 0001), compared with the path in the
absence of an aid scheme
structural adjustment program, where the aid
contract is made dependent on both the for-
est stock and the rate of deforestation.
[Received June 1997;
accepted June 1999.]
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